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Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are
considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a
two-dimensional lattice. The rate of strategy adoption from a randomly chosen neighbors are controlled by the
payoff difference and a two-value pre-factor w characterizing the players whom the strategy learned from. The
reduced teaching activity of players is distributed randomly with concentrations ν at the beginning and fixed
further on. Numerical and analytical calculations are performed to study the concentration of cooperators as a
function of w and ν for different noise levels and connectivity structures. Significant increase of cooperation is
found within a wide range of parameters for this dynamics. The results highlight the importance of asymmetry
characterizing the exchange of master-follower role during the strategy adoptions.
PACS numbers: 02.50.+Le, 87.23.Ge, 07.05.Tp
Different versions of evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) games are studied extensively to explore the possibil-
ities enhancing the cooperative (altruistic) behavior among
selfish individuals. Originally the Prisoner’s Dilemma repre-
sents those class of two-player symmetric matrix games where
the equivalent players have two choices [called cooperation
(C) or defection (D)] with a specific rank of order in the
four payoffs (dependent on their choices) enforcing both self-
ish (rational) individuals to choose defection instead of mu-
tual cooperation yielding significantly higher individual in-
comes for them [1, 2, 3]. This type of social dilemma can-
not be resolved within the framework of the traditional (two-
player, one-shot) game theory. During the last decades dif-
ferent mechanisms, e.g., kin selection [4], direct [5] and in-
direct [6] reciprocity, voluntary participation [7], and spatial
extensions [8], are found to support the emergence of cooper-
ative behavior in biological and ecological systems as well as
within human societies [9].
In a wide class of the spatial models [8, 10, 11], the play-
ers distributed on the sites x of a lattice can follow one of the
pure strategies (sx = C or D), their payoffs Ux come from
PD games with their neighbors, and sometimes the players
are allowed to modify their strategy according to an evolu-
tionary rule dependent on the local payoff distribution. The
analogy between these spatial evolutionary games and the
non-equilibrium kinetic Ising models has motivated a progres-
sive interest to utilize the tools of non-equilibrium statistical
physics in the investigation of evolutionary games (for a re-
view see [12]). In these models the connectivity structure of
the interacting players is described by a graph represented by
sites (players) and edges between the neighbors. Numerical
investigations on realistic connectivity structures (e.g., diluted
[13, 14] and hierarchical lattice [15], random graphs [16, 17],
small-world structures [18, 19], and real empirical networks
[20]) have also been performed for some time. The early in-
vestigations have indicated some increase in the concentration
of cooperators when the topological inhomogeneities are in-
creased. Similar phenomena can also be observed if the play-
ers are allowed to move on a lattice or graph (for a recent
survey see [21]). The systematic investigations, however, are
delayed by the large number of parameters characterizing the
payoffs, the connectivity structures, and the evolutionary rules
that can involve synchronization and/or noise and be affected
by the connectivity structure too.
In the last year Santos et al. [22, 23] observed dramatic
improvement in the maintenance of cooperation when con-
sidering an evolutionary PD game on scale-free structures at
a low noise level. In these systems the competition between
the cooperative and defective hubs (players with large number
of neighbors) provides a mechanism [23] enforcing coopera-
tion so much so that defectors can die out. The given evo-
lutionary rule involves intrinsically an inhomogeneous strat-
egy adoption probability due to the varying number of neigh-
bors. Remarkable increase of cooperation is also observed for
those systems where the inhomogeneous imitation activity is
introduced artificially to characterize the asymmetric and dif-
ferent influence of players to each other [24]. In the models
suggested by Wu et al. [19, 25], the influence of player y
to her neighbor x is quantified by a random parameter wxy
(0 < wxy 6= wyx < 1) affecting the preferential selection of a
neighbor whom the strategy can be adopted from.
Now we study the effect of payoffs and noise on the main-
tenance of cooperative behavior for some evolutionary PD
games where the inhomogeneities are involved in the dynam-
ical rules on regular connectivity structures. Our motivation
was to explore the consequence of varying activity in the strat-
egy imitation process. For this purpose, a simplified version
of the model introduced by Wu et al. [19, 25] will be con-
sidered by assuming only two possible values for wxy . First
our investigation is focused on a system where wxy depends
only on y and characterizes the teaching (helping) activity of
player y during the strategy imitations.
In the first model two types of players (A and B) are dis-
tributed randomly on a two-dimensional lattice before the start
of simulation and their distribution (nx = A or B) is fixed
later on. The concentration of players B and A are denoted
2by ν and (1−ν). Both types of players can follow the C or D
strategies and their total payoff comes from a PD game with
the neighbors as formulated in previous papers (see e.g., [26]).
For a given two-player game both players receive reward R
(or punishment P ) for mutual cooperation (or defection). If
the players follow different strategies then the defector re-
ceives the highest payoff T (temptation to choose defection)
meanwhile the cooperator gets the lowest (sucker’s) payoff S.
Henceforth our analysis will be restricted to the parametriza-
tion suggested by Nowak and May [8], i.e., R = 1; P = 0;
T = b (1 < b < 2); and S = 0.
For the evolutionary PD games the players try to maxi-
mize their individual payoff by imitating (learning) one of the
more successful neighboring strategies. Following our pre-
vious studies [12, 26], the evolution of the present system is
governed by subsequent strategy adoptions between randomly
chosen neighbors x and y. Namely, player x will adopt the
neighbor’s strategy sy with a probability depending on the
payoff difference (Ux − Uy) as
W (sx → sy) = wxy
1
1 + exp[(Ux − Uy)/K]
(1)
where K denotes the amplitude of noise. The pre-factor wxy
is given as
wxy =
{
1, if ny = A
w, if ny = B
, (2)
where the value of w (0 < w < 1) characterizes the strength
of reduced teaching activity if the site y is occupied by a
player of type B. One can think of a system consisting of
attractive and repulsive players (just like old and young indi-
viduals in some communities).
This system is studied by Monte Carlo (MC) simulations
started from a random initial distribution of C and D strate-
gies. The stationary state is characterized by the average con-
centration ρ of cooperators when the values of K , b, and ν are
varied systematically. First we discuss the MC results on the
Kagome lattice. The striking increase of ρ as a result of this
type of dynamical inhomogeneities is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Evidently, this model is equivalent to a homogeneous sys-
tem (discussed in [26]) if w = 1. Furthermore, the average
concentration of C strategies for ν = 0 is equivalent to those
for ν = 1 because the dynamics is homogeneous in both cases
(the relaxation, however, is slower for ν = 1 if w < 1). The
value of ρ increases monotonously until reaching the maxi-
mum value at ν ≈ 0.5. For sufficiently small values of w the
concentration of cooperators reaches its saturation value. Fig-
ure 1 shows clearly the existence of a parameter range within
which the defectors become extinct in the stationary states
(even for b > 1). The rigorous numerical analysis of the tran-
sition from the two-strategy (C+D) state to the homogeneous
(absorbing) state is made difficult by the slow relaxation pro-
cesses characterizing those systems where ”directed percola-
tion” type extinction process [27] is disturbed by quenched
disorder in the background [28, 29].
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FIG. 1: The concentration of cooperators (ρ) as a function of ν for
different rates of blocking (from bottom to top, w = 1, 0.2, 0.1, and
0.05) on the Kagome lattice if b = 1.03 and K = 0.5. Due to the
large system size (3 · 105 < N < 3 · 106) and long sampling times
the statistical errors of MC data are comparable to the line thickness.
Now the systematic study is addressed to explore the vari-
ations in the b − K phase diagram caused by the inhomoge-
neous dynamics. For this purpose we have determined the
critical values (bc1 and bc2) where the extinction of D and C
strategies occur when varying b for different noise levels (K).
Figure 2 compares two phase diagrams obtained for ν = 0
and ν = 0.5 (at w = 0.1).
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FIG. 2: The complete b − K phase diagrams for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game on the Kagome´ lattice for ν = 0 (left) and 0.5 (right).
Dashed lines indicate the common limit value of bc1 and bc2 when
K →∞ in the homogeneous system.
Figure 2 illustrates clearly the remarkable difference ap-
pearing in the high noise limit (K → ∞) while the effect
of quenched inhomogeneities vanishes if K → 0. The mean-
field calculation [12] predicts a step-like change between the
homogeneous C and D states at b = 1. The simulations re-
produce this prediction for only the homogeneous system in
the limit K → ∞. According to the simulations the phase
boundaries (bc1 and bc2) tend towards the same limit b∞ (if
K → ∞), however, the corresponding limit value is larger
than 1. The increase of b∞ (dependent on w and ν) cannot be
described by the mean-field approach. To overcome this short-
age we have determined the probability of all possible config-
urations on a triangle of sites allowing the uncorrelated distri-
bution of players A and B (survey of this technique is given
3in the Appendix of [12]). Evaluating 43 configuration proba-
bilities this approach is capable to reproduce qualitatively the
relevant features as demonstrated in Fig. 3.
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FIG. 3: Phase boundaries for the evolutionary PD game on the
Kagome´ lattice for ν = 0.5 and w = 0.1. Solid lines show the
predictions of the three-site approximation and the symbols indicate
the MC results.
In the low noise limit the maintenance of cooperation on the
Kagome lattice (for b > 1) is due to a mechanism supporting
the spreading of cooperators throughout overlapping triangles
of the connectivity structure [26, 30]. In the absence of this
topological feature bc2 goes to 1 linearly if K → 0. For ex-
ample, on the square lattice the cooperation disappear in these
types of evolutionary PG games if K → 0. When increasing
the noise level one can observe a peak in the concentration
of cooperators analogously to the so-called coherence reso-
nance [31, 32]. The significant differences in the low noise
behavior allows us to check the robustness of the observed
phenomenon. For this purpose the above analysis is repeated
on the square lattice.
The MC results on the square lattice (see Fig. 4) illus-
trates the same trend in the variation of bc1 and bc2 when the
quenched inhomogeneity of dynamics is applied (w = 0.1
and ν = 0.5).
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FIG. 4: Phase diagram of the evolutionary PD game on the square
lattice. Closed (open) squares indicate MC results for ν = 0 (ν =
0.5).
The plotted results confirm the above mentioned conclu-
sions. Namely, the effect of inhomogeneous dynamics van-
ishes in the zero noise limit and increases the values of bc1
and bc2. It is worth mentioning that the pair approximation
fails for the homogeneous system in the the low noise limit,
while its prediction is qualitatively correct for large K values
[26]. In agreement with the expectation, the extended ver-
sion of the (homogeneous) pair approximation gives account
of the simultaneous shift of both phase boundaries in a way
that (bc2 − bc1)→ 0 if K → ∞. The extended method takes
explicitly into account the different concentrations of coop-
erators on the sites of type A and B as well as distinct cor-
relations on pair of sites AA, BB, and AB. The results of
MC simulations and extended pair approximation have indi-
cated clearly that the concentration of cooperators on the sites
of type B is smaller than those we found on sites of type A
(shortly ρB < ρA) for the coexistence of C and D strategies.
This latter success of pair approximation has inspired us to in-
vestigate the changes in the probabilities of one- and two-site
configurations as well as in the transition rates between these
configurations. Unfortunately, we were not able to reveal a
simple and concise explanation on the mechanism supporting
cooperation.
Besides the above discussed inhomogeneous dynamics
there exists many other ways how inhomogeneous (and asym-
metric) activity can be taken into consideration in the strategy
adoption process. For example, we have studied what happens
if the learning activity is reduced for the players of type B.
In our notation it means that the strategy adoption probabil-
ity (1) is modified by substituting nx for ny in the expression
(2). Such a model can be used to study the effect of quenched
spatial disorder on cooperation if the system consist of quick-
(A) slow-witted (B) players. Surprisingly, MC simulations
demonstrates that cooperation is not modified relevantly by
the application of inhomogeneous learning activities on both
lattice structures for w = 0.1 and ν = 0.5. The weak effect
of this type of inhomogeneous learning activity is justified by
the analytical techniques too. Namely, the extended pair ap-
proximation on square lattice (three-site approximation on the
Kagome lattice) reproduces the result of homogeneous sys-
tem.
We have also studied a third type of models for which the
quenched values of wxy = wyx are chosen randomly to be w
or 1 with probabilities ν and (1 − ν). In this case the master-
follower role is symmetric between the connected players and
the dynamical inhomogeneity is represented by the randomly
distributed reduced links. Similarly to the second case the
simulations indicate no relevant changes in the strategy con-
centrations.
To have some further information about the role of the spa-
tial inhomogeneities and the asymmetry in the imitation pro-
cess we have studied a fourth case where players A and B
are located periodically in checkerboard-like manner. In this
case the role of reduced teaching from the sites of type B is
equivalent to the reduced learning activity at the sites of type
A. Furthermore, the interactions are constrained to the A−B
pairs. The effect of this type of dynamical inhomogeneity on
4the strategy concentrations depends on the parameter values.
An increase occurs in ρ for low values of b. For sufficiently
large b values the concentration of cooperators (and also bc2)
decreases with w.
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FIG. 5: Concentration of cooperators vs. b on the square lattice for
different systems: homogeneous (closed squares); reduced teaching
(open squares) and learning (open circles) activity at players B dis-
tributed randomly, checkerboard-like distribution of players A and
B (triangles); and randomly distributed wxy = wyx = 0, w (closed
circles) if ν = 0.5, w = 0.1, and K = 1.
In Figure 5 we illustrate the results of ρ deduced from MC
data on the square lattice for the mentioned distributions of
wxy . The variations can be measured from the results obtained
on the homogeneous system. It is clearly shown that the most
relevant enhancement of cooperation is found when the teach-
ing activity is reduced (or enhanced) from half of the players
distributed randomly. According to preliminary results this is
the only model among the investigated systems that is capable
to maintain cooperation if b > 1 for the high noise limit.
In summary, we have studied two-strategy evolutionary
PD games on two-dimensional lattices in which the master-
follower asymmetry between two neighboring players is taken
explicitly into account during the strategy adoption mecha-
nism. Our analysis is focused on several cases of the quenched
inhomogeneous dynamics. The most important increase of
cooperativity is found for those systems where the enhanced
teaching activity is concentrated on a portion of local players
(masters or leaders) distributed randomly in the whole system.
It is conjectured that the spontaneous appearance of local lead-
ers can be recognized for those human and animal societies
where mimics (learning) plays a crucial role in the mainte-
nance of cooperation.
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